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COMMENTS
TITLE VII: AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY FOR
GENDER INEQUITY IN
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
I. INTRODUCTION
The quest for gender equality in college athletics is a road that has
been heavily traveled. For well over twenty-five years, women have pur-
sued equal opportunities on the playing field.' The main avenue utilized
in achieving that goal has been the application of Title IX of the Educa-
tion Act of 19722 (hereinafter Title IX) to collegiate athletic programs.3
While this legislation has allowed women to make great strides in their
quest for athletic equality, which has frequently resulted in increased
participation opportunities for women, it has not fully remedied the
problem of gender inequity. Accordingly, while the use of Title IX has
effectively increased opportunities for women and eliminated a portion
of the existing gender bias, it has not eliminated all of the gender ineq-
uity present in collegiate athletic programs. As such, Title IX should not
be the only available remedial option for female athletes facing
discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 (hereinafter Title VII) pro-
tects individuals from employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex and national origin.5 If colleges and universities are
defined as employers of the scholarship athlete, as they should be, pro-
tection under Title VII becomes available.6 Accordingly, a female ath-
lete who does not receive the same privileges of "employment" as a male
1. Daniel Mahony & Donna Pastore, Distributive Justice: An Examination of Participation
Opportunities, Revenues and Expenses at NCAA Institutions 1973-1993, 22 J. SPORT & Soc.
IssuEs 127, 127 (1998).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
3. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1994).
5. EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FILING A CHARGE OF JOB DISCRINMINA-
TION (1999) [hereinafter EEOC].
6. Protection under Title VII is not predicated on being an employee; it is available to any
individual. However, this comment will focus on disparate treatment females receive regard-
ing fringe benefits of employment as college athletes. Accordingly, Title VII will be discussed
in the context of an existing employer-employee relationship.
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athlete should have the ability to file a discrimination claim using Title
VII because her employment rights will have been violated.
Although, at first glance, Title IX seems an adequate remedy to the
problem of gender discrimination in college athletics, it has not been
completely effective thus far. As stated, Title IX has primarily been used
to effectuate a positive change in the number of female participants in
collegiate athletic programs. Title VII, however, can be effective in bal-
ancing the benefits received between male and female college athletes.
Title VII provides a new avenue that can be taken in the pursuit of gen-
der equity. When applied to college athletics, Title VII would undoubt-
edly rejuvenate the quest for gender equality; it would provide a new
and useful method for achieving the goal.
This comment will primarily address the viability of a Title VII claim
in the area of college athletics. First, however, the comment will discuss
the impact of Title IX on college athletics thus far, and the disparate
treatment female athletes continue to experience. Next, Title VII will be
discussed, specifically the requirements for filing a Title VII claim. Em-
phasis will be placed on the idea that under Title VII, an employer-em-
ployee relationship exists between the scholarship athlete and the
educational institution. Next, the benefits of using Title VII to remedy
gender inequity in college athletics will be discussed. Finally, the com-
ment addresses potential ramifications of applying Title VII to college
athletics.
As stated by Robert Frost, at times taking the road less traveled is
what makes all the difference. 7 By applying Title VII to college athletic
programs, a world of difference can be made regarding gender inequity.
II. GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
A. History
Historically, female athletes have not dominated college athletic pro-
grams. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, opportunities for women inter-
ested in participating in college athletics were quite limited.8 It is
estimated that in 1969, only about 16,000 women competed in college
athletics.9 Although opportunities for women increased slightly, women
still accounted for less than 20% of athletes at National Collegiate Ath-
7. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, reprinted in TiiREE BoOKs 119 (1916).
8. Daniel Mahony, Collective Reaction to Injustice in Intercollegiate Athletics, 23 J. SPORT
& Soc. IssuEs 328, 329 (1999).
9. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, The Status of Women in Intercollegiate Ath-
letics, in WOMEN, SPORT AND CuLTum 111, 112 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole eds., 1994).
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letic Association (hereinafter NCAA) member institutions during the
1970s.10 Additionally, female athletes did not receive financial assis-
tance in the form of scholarships until the mid-1970s, and then only ap-
proximately ten thousand dollars per year was spent directly on college
athletics for women."
In contrast, opportunities for male athletes in the 1970s were numer-
ous. In 1973, approximately 165,000 men competed at NCAA member
institutions, accounting for more than 90% of participation.' 2 Division I
schools spent more than $1.5 million per year on male athletic pro-
grams. 3 It is clear by looking at this comparison that the "opportunities
and resources spent on men's college sports were significantly larger
than what was afforded the women.""'
Although there was clearly disparate treatment of female athletes in
the 1960s and 1970s, an analysis of more recent NCAA data indicates
that change has occurred in the distribution of athletic resources at
NCAA member schools.'" In 1994, there were over 160,000 female col-
lege athletes.'6 As compared to 1973, women have approximately 57%
more opportunities to participate at NCAA schools.' 7 In addition, the
amount of money used to fund women's collegiate athletics increased
dramatically during the same period of time."8 Although disparate treat-
ment still exists, primarily in the area of benefits received by female ath-
letes,' 9 positive changes have occurred." Participation opportunities
have increased, and there has been a rise in the funding available to
female athletic programs.2' These changes are due, in large part, to the
application of Title IX to college athletics.
10. Mahony, supra note 8, at 332.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 332-33.
15. Id.
16. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 9, at 112.
17. Mahony, supra note 8, at 330.
18. Id. at 331.
19. Felice Duffy, Twenty-Seven Years Post Title IX: Why Gender Equity in College Athlet-
ics Does Not Exist, 19 QUmNnPIAc L. REv. 67, 68 (2000).
20. Mahony, supra note 8, at 330.
21. Id. at 329.
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1. Title IX Defined
Title IX "forbids discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational
program or activity receiving federal funds."'22 In pertinent part, the
statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance .... "I
Congress enacted Title IX in response to a finding of "pervasive dis-
crimination against women with respect to educational opportunities."24
Case law dictates that "Title IX was passed with two objectives in mind:
to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices,
and to provide individual citizens effective protection against those prac-
tices."'25 Although the statute does not identify athletes directly, it had
an immediate impact on collegiate athletic programs "because differ-
ences in opportunities and resources provided strong evidence of dis-
crimination. ' 26 As interpreted by the courts, Title IX was "designed to
remedy gender discrimination against the underrepresented athletes-
either men or women." 27
Those challenging Title IX identified its potentially disruptive effect
immediately.2 8 In 1984, those in opposition won a major battle. The
court in Grove City College v. Bell29 held that "Title IX applied only to
those specific programs that received federal funds, and not to an entire
institution."3 This decision had a very limiting effect on the potential
impact of Title IX "because the majority of college athletic departments
did not receive direct federal aid."'"
Fortunately for female athletes, the "program-specific approach" was
rather short-lived.32 In 1988, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act, which, in effect, "reestablished the institutional approach for
Title IX.,,33 This required all programs at educational institutions, in-
22. Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Sexual Violence Against Women: Defining the Limits
of Institutional Responsibility, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 55, 74 (1998).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
24. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1St Cir. 1996).
25. Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
26. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
27. Keley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237, 243 (D. Ill. 1993).
28. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
29. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
30. Id. at 573-74; Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
31. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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cluding athletics, receiving federal funds to comply with Title IX.3" This
change led to widespread litigation concerning Title IX's effect on the
inequities present in college athletics.35
2. Title IX Applied
While both men and women have filed cases alleging gender discrim-
ination under Title IX, the majority of cases focus on the application of
Title IX to remedy the disparate treatment that female athletes re-
ceive.36 There can be no argument that, since its passage in 1972, women
have used Title IX to their advantage. The opportunities for women to
participate in college athletics, the funding for female programs, and the
number of scholarships available for female athletes have all increased in
the past twenty years.37 However, while some feel "[t]here is little doubt
that the passage and the threat of enforcement of Title IX resulted in a
vast improvement in the sporting opportunities and resources available
to girls and women in... institutions of higher education in the U. S.,5"
3 8
Title IX's application to college athletics has not solved all problems
stemming from gender inequity. "Despite Title IX's many victories over
the last several years, equality for female athletes remains an unmet goal
at most schools. ' 39 Gender inequality still runs rampant within college
and university athletic programs.4 °
B. Present Discrimination
The previous section addressed the ways in which Title IX sparked
positive change in the quest for gender equality in college athletics. At
first glance, Title IX provided a more than adequate remedy for gender
inequity. However, despite some improvement, gender equity in inter-
collegiate athletics has not been achieved.4' While it is undisputed that
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The application of Title LX to college athletics is quite detailed and complex; accord-
ingly, an entire comment could be dedicated to the application of Title LX alone. However,
because the primary focus of this comment is the proposed application of Title VII to college
athletics, Title IX is only discussed in a general sense.
37. Mahony, supra note 8, at 329.
38. Annelies Knoppers, Politics, Public Policy and Title IX, in WoMiEN, SPORT AND CUL-
ruR, supra note 9, at 97, 103.
39. Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road
Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 Duicn J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 51, 68
(1996).
40. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 139.
41. Id.
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Title IX has been a catalyst for reform of college athletic programs, it has
not eliminated the disparate treatment female athletes endure.42 "In
1997, it was estimated that 80% to 90% of the athletic programs of...
post-secondary educational institutions were not in compliance with Ti-
tle IX."' Arguably, female athletes still face gender inequity. The gen-
der inequity that continues to exist is best evidenced by examining the
following five aspects of male and female athletic programs.
1. General Participation
In 1995, there was a national average of 8.35 college sports teams per
university for men and 8.04 college sports teams per university for wo-
men.4 4 On its face, that statistic seems to indicate that gender inequity,
in terms of participation opportunities, is almost nonexistent. However,
the previous statistic fails to indicate that the average number of male
athletes participating in college athletics, per institution, was 245, while
the average number of female athletes was only 143.4 1 Further support
that athletic participation levels are still disproportionate can be found
by looking at, for example, the male/female athlete to student ratio at
Louisiana State University (hereinafter LSU). Currently, the student
population at LSU is 51% male and 49% female; however, the popula-
tion participating in the athletic program is 71% male and 29% female.46
In addition to the previous statistics, a trend has developed amongst
educational institutions that indicates the discrepancy that exists be-
tween male and female participation rates. To facilitate Title IX compli-
ance, and ensure that the sports offered and participation opportunities
provided for male and female athletes are comparable, many universities
eliminate men's non-revenue sports teams, instead of increasing oppor-
tunities for women.47 "This trend is likely to continue because the court
held in Kelley v. University of Illinois4s that using this strategy (eliminat-
ing men's opportunities while maintaining the same number of female
opportunities) was a legally appropriate way to achieve Title IX compli-
ance. ' 49 Male athletes have almost twice the number of participation
42. Mahony, supra note 8, at 329.
43. Duffy, supra note 19, at 68 (citing NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETc AssoCIATION,
NCAA GENDER EQuIry STUDY (1997)).
44. Id. at 92 (citing Brian Metzler & Carol Rowe, Poor Sports, BOULDER NEWS, Apr.
1997, at 4).
45. Id.
46. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5 h Cir. 2000).
47. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 139.
48. 832 F. Supp. at 237.
49. Id. at 244; Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 142.
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opportunities as female athletes." Accordingly, educational institutions
would rather decrease the male opportunities than increase female op-
portunities to equal the opportunities available to both sexes." This
remedy, while legally appropriate under Title IX, is not an effective solu-
tion. Moreover, it demonstrates the disparate treatment female athletes
receive regarding participation opportunities.
2. Recruiting and Scholarships
"In 1992, twenty years after the enactment of Title IX, on average,
less than 20% of recruiting funds went to women in college athletics,
25% of the total operating budgets went to women, and institutions allo-
cated only 20% to 42% of athletic scholarships to women. '5 2 These per-
centages remain accurate today.53 Overall, female athletes receive
approximately $184 million less in athletic scholarships than do male ath-
letes, and male athletes "have more than three times the financial re-
sources in the areas of recruiting and operating expenses. 5 4
A recent survey published by The Chronicle of Higher Education in-
dicates that over one hundred colleges or universities currently allot a
disproportionate percentage of their scholarship and recruiting budgets
to female athletes.5 For example, Miami University had a total scholar-
ship budget of $3,215,937 as of June 2000.56 Of that, $1,025,262, or 32%,
was allotted to females.5 7 However, 45% of the athletes at Miami Uni-
versity are females. 58 Accordingly, the budgetary allocation of scholar-
ships for female athletes is disproportionate. 9
In the area of recruiting budgets, as of June 2000, Miami University
allotted $268,006, or 72% of its total recruiting budget to male teams,
while only $103,887, or 28%, was allotted for recruiting female ath-
50. Duffy, supra note 19, at 92. The discrepancy between male and female participants is
most likely attributable to college football programs. Admittedly, there is no female
equivalent to men's football. Thus, the athletic opportunities for females at the college level
are still considerably unequal to those of men.
51. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 139.
52. Duffy, supra note 19, at 92.
53. Id. at 68.
54. Id.
55. Facts and Figures, THE CHRON. oF HIGHER EDUC., at http://chronicle.com/
search97cgi/s97_cgi, May 21, 1999 (last visited June 29, 2000).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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letes.6° Clearly, Title IX has not effectively eliminated gender inequity
in the area of recruiting and scholarships.
3. Operating Expenses: Travel Expenses and Per Diem Allowance;
Equipment and Supplies
Analyzing operating expense budgets for intercollegiate athletic pro-
grams reveals that gender inequity is widespread. The Chronicle of
Higher Education reported that over two hundred educational institu-
tions spent less than half of their athletic operating expense budgets on
female athletes.61 While in some cases the numbers are only slightly dis-
proportionate, there are examples of extreme inequity.62 For example,
at the University of Arizona, 75% of the operating expense budget is
spent on male athletes, while only 25% is spent on female athletes.63
Additionally, when the overall operating expense budgets are broken
down, and specific benefits are analyzed individually, evidence of gender
inequity is again present. For example, although on a per capita basis
travel expenses and per diem allowances for male and female athletes
may appear equal, it can still be argued that the two genders are treated
differently.64
Department policies differ in terms of the number of people on a
team, length of time on road trips, number of total road trips, and
road trips that require overnights. Male teams traditionally have
more overnight trips. . . and more overnight stays . . . The fact
that women comprise only 36% of college athletes makes this
practice discriminatory, despite equal individual allowances per
trip, because universities spend only 36% of the budget on wo-
men's travel.65
Another area where discrimination is prevalent is the provision of
equipment and supplies. Title IX does not mandate that budgetary allo-
cation to each gender be exactly identical.66 Rather, the legislation only
requires that the equipment provided to both male and female teams be
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Duffy, supra note 19, at 95.
65. Id. (citing RIcHARD TELANDER, FROM RED INK TO RED RosEs (1994); NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, TITLE IX AND MEN'S MINOR SPORTS: A FALSE CoNFLicr (1997);
Anne Bloom, Financial Disparity as Evidence of Discrimination Under Title IX, 2 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 9 (1995)).
66. Bloom, supra note 65, at 14-15.
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of the same quality.6 7 Accordingly, it is acceptable that universities fail
to provide women's programs that require expensive equipment (such as
gymnastics and ice hockey),6 8 yet still provide programs such as men's
football (which requires a significant amount of equipment), as long as
the quality of equipment that all athletes receive is the same.6 9 A male
program that requires expensive equipment will likely be implemented
or maintained, whereas a female program requiring costly equipment
will not.7" This provides evidence of the preferential treatment that male
athletic programs receive.
Additionally, it is important to note that most prominent men's
teams are sponsored by equipment companies, and these teams receive
equipment that is not factored into the universities' equipment budg-
ets.7 It is likely that even at universities that provide an equal equip-
ment budget for both men's and women's teams, the women are still
subject to an unequal distribution of equipment.7"
4. Practice and Competitive Facilities
"Traditionally, men get more and better time on the practice and
game fields."73 University athletic directors often justify this practice by
arguing that men's sports receive significantly more spectators, and pro-
duce more revenue, than do women's athletic events.74 However, "it
could be argued that ... acceptance of college sports for women has
been slow,"7 5 because "the fact remains that athletic departments gener-
ally have not been successful at making women's sports into major reve-
nue producers and profit making entities."76
If women's sporting contests are never given the "prime time" play-
ing time, it is impossible to judge how many spectators would attend a
given event, and how much revenue would be produced.77 Accordingly,
unequal use of facilities, for both practice and hosting athletic competi-
tions, demonstrates another area in which female athletes face disparate
treatment.
67. Id.
68. Duffy, supra note 19, at 94.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 94.
73. Id. at 97.
74. Id.
75. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 131.
76. Id. at 133.
77. Duffy, supra note 19, at 97.
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5. Publicity
"Disparity in coverage of male and female athletes by the athletic
sports information departments is common. '7 8 To justify this, athletic
directors use an argument similar to the one presented in the facilities
context: women's sports do not generate public interest, and therefore, it
is an inefficient use of resources to allocate funding and personnel to
cover female athletic events.79 "However, the sports information direc-
tors are actually in a position to affect these policies by conditioning re-
leases of information about major men's sports on the publication of
women's sports. Media coverage is ... in the control of the department
and should be considered when assessing gender equity."80
As evidenced by the preceding examples, it is obvious that despite
some of the increases in opportunities for female athletes facilitated by
the application of Title IX to college athletics, gender inequity is still
present. "Most schools still offer more scholarships for male athletes
and spend considerably more money on male sports.""' Even though
many "advances have been made in the past twenty-five years, women
are still struggling to enforce the intent of Title IX, and proportionality
at most schools is still a dream." 82 The former Advocacy Director for
the Women's Sports Foundation, Kathryn Reith, believes that the quest
for gender equality has become somewhat stagnant.83 Reith has stated
that "the process has stalled," and that "we are sort of stuck at [a] level
of discrimination that [the educational institutions] are comfortable
with."84 One possible way to revitalize the movement for gender equal-
ity within college athletics is to use a new avenue to effectuate change.
That avenue is Title VII.
III. TITLE VII AS A VIABLE REMEDY FOR GENDER DISCRnNATION
IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
A. Objective of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.s
78. Id. at 98.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Mahony, supra note 8, at 329.
82. Id. at 329-330.
83. Susan Morse, Women and Sports, 2 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 195, 198 (1992).
84. Id.
85. EEOC, supra note 5.
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Title VII provides, in material part: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin." 6 Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate in
any area of employment, "including hiring, firing, promotion, layoff,
compensation, benefits, job assignments, training ... or any other terms
of employment."'
Title VII was enacted by Congress "to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities."8 8  In interpreting Title VII, "[c]ourts have prohib-
ited both the disparate treatment of individuals and the use of policies
that have a disparate impact on protected classes. Even those employ-
ment policies that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation have
been declared unlawful."8 9 Congress intended Title VII to offer compre-
hensive protections and, in short, eliminate discrimination in the
workplace. 90
B. The Elements of a Title VII Claim
There are two primary requirements necessary to sustain a Title VII
claim. First, the individual bringing the claim must be a member of a
protected class.91 The classes which receive protection under Title VII
are those based on sex, race, color, religion or national origin.92 Second,
the alleged discriminating party must be an employer covered under Ti-
tle VII.93 All private employers, state and local governments, and edu-
cational institutions that employ fifteen or more individuals are covered
by Title VII.94 Accordingly, a female scholarship athlete filing a claim
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1994).
87. EEOC, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
88. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75,75 (1984) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
89. Id.
90. Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The Case for the
Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2613, 2622-23 (1998).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
92. EEOC, supra note 5.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
94. Id. It should also be noted that the question of whether the defendant in a Title VII
action is a covered employee is greatly debated. Employers will often claim that its workers
are independent contractors and that the fifteen employee requirement is not met. See Ort-
ner, supra note 89, at 2647. However, in any Title VII case brought against a college or uni-
versity, it would be implausible to argue that the college or university did not have fifteen
employees. Accordingly, that issue will not be addressed as part of this comment.
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against her university under Title VII would have no difficulty meeting
these two initial requirements.
In any action brought by a scholarship athlete under Title VII at-
tempting to remedy the disparate treatment females receive with regard
to privileges or fringe benefits of employment, the college or university
would likely move for summary judgment." In so doing, the college or
university may claim that the relationship between the scholarship ath-
lete and the educational institution is not one of employment, and there-
fore, not governed by Title VII.96 The prospective plaintiff would have
to show that a scholarship athlete is, in fact, an employee of his or her
school and, therefore, Title VII is applicable.97
In the past, scholarship athletes have had difficulty convincing courts
that they are employees for the purposes of Workers' Compensation
Acts.98 However, the policy of Title VII is different from that of work-
95. Thomas Archer, The Structure of a Title VII Action Against a College for the Enforce-
mient of NCAA Proposition 48, 2 SPORTS LAW. J. 111, 113 (1995).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Several cases have addressed the issue of whether an athletic scholarship is, in effect,
an employment contract that creates an employer-employee relationship between the educa-
tional institution and the athlete. One of the first cases to address this question was Van Horn
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). Van Horn was a
student athlete killed in a plane crash while traveling from an intercollegiate football game.
After his death, his widow and minor children applied for death benefits, asserting that Van
Horn was an employee of his university. The Industrial Accident Commission ("IAC") de-
nied the award. Upon review, the Van Horn court held Van Horn had made a prima facie
showing of an employment contract and remanded the case for further consideration by the
JAC. The Van Horn court reasoned that because Van Horn's athletic prowess and member-
ship on an athletic team were factors in his receipt of an athletic scholarship, the scholarship
could constitute an employment contract. Id. at 169.
After Van Horn, the NCAA went on alert and began implementing language and policies
that would lessen the resemblance between the athletic scholarship and an employment con-
tract. ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HimR: THE
EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA's AMATEUR MYTH 80-81(1998). In 1983, the
NCAA received support for that principle with the decision of Rensing v. Board of Trustees,
444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983).
Rensing was an Indiana State University football player who was paralyzed during spring
football practice. In denying his workers' compensation claim, the Rensing court held that
intercollegiate sports are clearly distinguished from professional sports and that financial in-
ducements in the form of scholarships and financial aid based on athletic ability cannot be
considered an employment contract. SACK & STAUROWSKY, at 85.
After the Rensing decision, several other courts held that, in the context of workers' com-
pensation, the athletic scholarship does not constitute an employment contract. Coleman v.
W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Graczyk v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd.,
229 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Townsend v. California, 237 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987). However, these cases all incorporate the specific principles of workers compensa-
tion law into the analysis of whether a scholarship athlete is a university employee. When
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ers' compensation. The decisions in the context of workers' compensa-
tion focus on the definition of employee contained in workers'
compensation statutes. 99 However, the definition of employee contained
in Title VII is much broader than the definition contained in workers'
compensation statutes.' 0 Accordingly, the analysis of the courts under
the workers' compensation framework does not apply to employer-em-
ployee questions in other legal contexts. 10' Scholarship athletes have a
much stronger argument that the relationship between the educational
institution and the scholarship athlete is one of employment when ana-
lyzed under Title VII.' °2
Perhaps the most effective argument a scholarship athlete could
make is that the athlete's acceptance of a scholarship, in exchange for
participation on an athletic team, is the formation of a contract between
the educational institution and the athlete. 0 3 Such a conclusion is easily
reached when the three basic elements of contract law are applied to the
relationship between the scholarship athlete and the educational
institution.
For a contract to exist, the elements of offer, acceptance, and consid-
eration must be present. 04 In the context of college athletics, all three
elements are easily satisfied. First, it is clear that when an educational
institution recruits a scholarship athlete, the college or university is of-
fering the athlete an opportunity to attempt to participate in an athletic
analyzed in the context of Title VII, an entirely different conclusion must be reached. Under
Title VII, a scholarship athlete would be an employee of the educational institution.
99. For example, the state of Wisconsin workers' compensation statute defines employees
as "[e]very person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, all
helpers and assistants of employers, whether paid by the employer or employee, if employed
with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer.... ." Wis. STAT. § 102.07(4)(a)
(1999).
100. Title VII defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer." 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
101. Charlotte M. Rasche, Can Universities Afford to Pay for Play? A Look at Vicarious
Liability Implications of Compensating College Athletes, 16 Rv. LrrIx. 219, 235 (1997).
102. Archer, supra note 95, at 113.
103. Courts have recognized that contractual relationships are created by scholarship
agreements. In Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972), the court
determined that the agreement signed between the scholarship athlete and the university cre-
ated a contractual relationship under which each party was required to fulfill their respective
obligations. Id. at 382. Additionally, other courts have addressed the issue of a contractual
relationship existing between a student and a university. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d
410 (7'1 Cir. 1992); Ward v. Wash. State Univ. 695 P.2d 133 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
104. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs §52 (1981).
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program. 10 5 Second, the athlete demonstrates his or her acceptance of
the educational institution's offer by signing the NCAA National Letter
of Intent. °6 This letter contractually binds the athlete to compete at the
respective university.10 7 Finally, consideration is found in the scholar-
ship itself.' 8 Athletes receive varied benefits ranging from full tuition,
room and board, to smaller benefits in the form of tuition reduction.0 9
Regardless of the benefit, the element of consideration is met.
It is apparent that the colleges and universities intend for scholarship
athletes to be contractually bound to the institution."' Colleges and
universities recruit scholarship athletes for their superior athletic abili-
ties. Stated differently, they are "hired for a specific purpose.""' Schol-
arship athletes are required to sign letters of intent indicating the
educational institution to which they are committing their services.'
Moreover, scholarship athletes receive compensation. The procedure
entailed in distributing the athletic scholarship is a valid basis for con-
cluding that the scholarship athlete is indeed under contract as an em-
ployee of the educational institution."13
Still, courts have been reluctant to alter the dynamics of collegiate
athletics by holding that such a contract creates an employee-employer
relationship." 4 The existence of the contract has been recognized;" 5 the
employment relationship stemming from the contract has not.116 Until
courts are willing to accept that the athletic scholarship is an employ-
ment contract, it will be necessary for scholarship athletes to prove their
105. David W. Woodburn, College Athletes Should Be Entitled to Workers Compensation
For Sports Related Injuries: A Request to Broaden the Definition of Employee Under Ohio
Revised Code Section 4123.01, 28 AKRON L. Rnv. 611, 630 (1995).
106. Id.
107. Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 379.
108. Woodburn, supra note 105, at 631.
109. Orion Riggs, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics,
5(3) KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 143 (1996).
110. Id. at 139.
111. Id. at 143.
112. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DIvIsION I MAN-
UAL ART. 13.02.9 (2000) [hereinafter MANUAL]. The letter of intent is signed by the athlete
after the recruitment process. It is analogous to the standard contract; the university makes
the athlete an offer, the athlete accepts the offer by signing the letter of intent, and both
parties then provide consideration, namely the educational institution providing the athlete
the opportunity to participate and the athletes actual participation.
113. Riggs, supra note 109, at 143.
114. Id.
115. Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 379.
116. Riggs, supra note 109, at 143.
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employment status in accord with the methods traditionally used in the
context of Title VII.
1. The Employer-Employee Relationship
The existence of an employer-employee relationship is one of the
most debated elements of a Title VII claim. Title VII defines an em-
ployee as "an individual employed by an employer."" 7 This language is
quite ambiguous. Accordingly, the judiciary developed three tests used
to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists: (1) the
common law test; (2) the economic realities test; and (3) the hybrid
test."
8
a. The Common Law Test
The common law test focuses on whether an employer had the right
to control the details and means by which work was completed and the
result accomplished by the work." 9 The Supreme Court has defined the
test as the following:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among other factors relevant to this inquiry are
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign addi-
tional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of pay-
ment; and the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants
120
Although this list is not determinative, it illustrates many factors the
courts consider when using the common law test to determine if an em-
ployer-employee relationship exists.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(f) (1994).
118. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond Economic Realities: The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38
B.C. L. REv. 239, 247-48 (1997).
119. Id. at 248.
120. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (quoting Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1988)).
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b. The Economic Realities Test
The economic realities test asks whether an individual is "economi-
cally dependent for his livelihood on the business to which the person
performs a service.' 1 21 There are five factors used to make that determi-
nation: (1) the extent of the employer's supervision and control over the
worker; (2) responsibility and cost for orientation and equipment; (3) the
length of job commitment and/or expectations; (4) the kind of occupa-
tion and skill required; and (5) the method of payment and benefits. 122
c. The Hybrid Test
The test courts use most often is the hybrid test.123 The factors usu-
ally considered by courts under the hybrid test are: (1) the type of occu-
pation; (2) the skill required; (3) whether the individual or the employer
furnishes the equipment with which the work is done; (4) the length of
time the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment; (6) the man-
ner in which the work relationship can be terminated; and (7) the inten-
tion of the parties.' 4
2. The Employer-Employee Relationship in the Context of College
Athletics: The Athlete Control Test
When comparing the preceding three tests, it becomes evident that
five factors are common to each test.'25 These same five factors also
apply to the relationship between the educational institution and the
scholarship athlete because they address the more fundamental aspects
of the relationship. Accordingly, when determining whether a scholar-
ship athlete is an employee of his or her university, a fourth test, which
will be termed the "Athlete Control Test," should be applied.
The Athlete Control Test will analyze the following five factors: (1)
the degree of control the university exercises over the scholarship ath-
lete; (2) opportunities the scholarship athlete creates for an educational
institution's profit or loss; (3) the university's investment in facilities
used by the scholarship athlete; (4) permanency of the relationship be-
121. Kimberly Hayes, On the Clock Versus on the Books: The Appropriate Method for
Counting Employees Under Title VII, the ADEA and Other Labor Laws, 44 BuFF. L. Rnv.
963, 986 (1996).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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tween the university and the scholarship athlete; and (5) the scholarship
athlete's required skill.126
a. Degree of Control
The educational institution has a great degree of control over the
scholarship athlete. 27 This is evidenced by the emphasis that is placed
on athletics as opposed to other aspects of student life. During the play-
ing season, most aspects of the athlete's life are dictated by the athletic
program.
i. Athletics v. Academics
Some scholarship athletes are athletes first, and students second.
Their first priority is the athletic program in which they participate. For
example, at Creighton University, the athletic department encouraged a
scholarship athlete to register for courses such as Marksmanship and
Theory of Basketball, even though such courses did not count towards a
university degree. 2 Additionally, the same scholarship athlete was pro-
vided with a secretary to read his assignments and prepare and type his
papers. 2 9
Unfortunately, this is just one of many examples where the scholar-
ship athlete is expected to put his athletic responsibilities ahead of his
academic responsibilities. Although instances such as the one described
above are probably more prevalent at schools with larger athletic pro-
grams, it is plausible to assume that the academic integrity of athletes is
compromised at almost every educational institution where a scholarship
athlete is expected to make a positive contribution to his or her athletic
team. Conduct by athletic departments similar to the conduct of Creigh-
ton University is evidence that a scholarship athlete's existence is con-
trolled to a great degree by the educational institution.
ii. Athletics v. Work Study
In addition to fulfilling all of the athletic requirements mandated by
the coach and the school, the scholarship athlete's life off the playing
field is also controlled to a great degree. 3 ° For example, during both the
academic semester and the summers between school years, scholarship
126. Id.
127. Riggs, supra note 109, at 144.
128. Ross, 957 F.2d at 412.
129. Id.
130. Riggs, supra note 109, at 144.
20001
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
athletes' employment decisions are strictly regulated.131 During the ath-
letic season, student athletes are not allowed to hold full or part-time
jobs.132 During the off-season, a scholarship athlete must remit his or
her earnings to the educational institution, and the earnings are then
applied against the athlete's scholarship. 33 During the summer, when
the scholarship athlete should be allowed a break from the confines of
the scholarship agreement, the NCAA still controls the employment op-
portunities a scholarship athlete can accept.13 4 Accordingly, even when a
scholarship athlete is not at practice or playing in a game, his or her
choices and decisions are limited.
b. Opportunities for Profit or Loss
"Although the concept of amateurism is firmly embedded in college
athletics, college athletics has become big business.' 35 This is evidenced
by the $1 billion dollar television contract between Columbia Broadcast-
ing System (hereinafter CBS) and the NCAA. 3 6 Additionally, Notre
Dame University and National Broadcasting Company (hereinafter
NBC) have a $38 million contract that grants NBC exclusive broadcast-
ing rights for Notre Dame athletic contests. 37 These contracts, how-
ever, are not the only evidence of the money involved in college
athletics.
In 1996, both Virginia Tech and the University of Texas earned $8.3
million by playing in the Sugar Bowl.'38 That same year, the University
of Nebraska and the University of Florida each earned $8.8 million for
playing in the Fiesta Bowl.139 These figures seem outrageous; however,
considering the increased involvement of corporate sponsors and televi-
sion with intercollegiate athletics, they are not outlandish. 40
When the contracts are considered together with the amount of reve-
nue that colleges and universities generate from athletic programs each
year, it is clear that there is a direct correlation between an educational
institution's yearly profits or losses and the athletic program. The ath-
131. Id. at 139-40.
132. Id. at 139.
133. Id. at 139-40.
134. Id. at 140.
135. Rasche, supra note 101, at 220.
136. Woodburn, supra note 105, at 611.
137. Id.
138. Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship
Athletes Are An Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 167, 180 (1996).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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letic program could not exist, and certainly could not produce a profit
for the college or university, without the scholarship athletes. Therefore,
the scholarship athlete has a substantial effect on the yearly profits of the
college or university.
c. Facilities
The educational institution also controls the athletic facilities used by
scholarship athletes. Educational institutions are the primary providers
of facilities, equipment, and supplies for their athletic teams. Whether
the athlete is participating in a practice session or playing in an athletic
contest, he or she is undoubtedly using equipment and playing in a facil-
ity controlled by the college or university.
Additionally, as stated earlier, athletic departments exercise total
control over scheduling and uniforms. Athletes have no control over
which teams use which practice and playing facilities throughout the ath-
letic season, or which equipment they practice with, or which uniforms
they wear. The athletes have no control or decision making power with
respect to equipment and facilities.
The lack of control over equipment and facilities is analogous to the
traditional employer-employee relationship. In the conventional em-
ployment setting, employees perform their job responsibilities in facili-
ties provided and regulated by the employer. Employees seldom create
their own training and work schedules; that task belongs to the employer
as well. Finally, employers typically require employees to wear a uni-
form or conform to a specific dress code. Just as the traditional em-
ployee is mandated by the employer's rules regarding facilities and
equipment, so too is the scholarship athlete.
d. Permanency of Relationship
In the case of college athletics, the employer-employee relationship
has the potential to last four years. While it is true that some athletes
enter professional sports before completing four years of college, and
the scholarship itself is only a one-year renewable agreement,' 4 ' those
facts do not change the overall average duration of the relationship.
Many athletes participate in college athletic programs as scholarship ath-
letes for at least four years. The duration of the relationship is con-
trolled by the college or university. 42 According to the NCAA Manual,
an athlete's scholarship can be terminated by the educational institution.
141. Riggs, supra note 109, at 144.
142. Ukeiley, supra note 138, at 190.
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Section 15.3.4.1 of the NCAA Manual... expressly provides the uni-
versity with this authority. The Manual states:
Reduction and Cancellation Permitted. Institutional financial aid
based in any degree on athletics ability may be reduced or can-
celed during the period of the award if the recipient:
(a) Renders himself or herself ineligible for intercollegiate
competition; or
(b) Fraudulently misrepresents any information on an applica-
tion, letter of intent or financial aid agreement; or
(c) Engages in serious misconduct warranting substantial dis-
ciplinary penalty; or
(d) Voluntarily withdraws from a sport at any time for per-
sonal reasons; however, the recipient's financial aid may not be
awarded to another student-athlete in the term in which the aid
was reduced or cancelled.' 43
Accordingly, if a scholarship athlete engages in any activity that ei-
ther results in a declaration of ineligibility, or is considered misconduct
in the eyes of the educational institution, the athlete's scholarship may
be reduced or canceled. Again, this situation is analogous to a tradi-
tional employee-employer relationship.
In the conventional employment setting, there are certain violations
of an employment contract which, if committed by an employee, could
result in the employee's termination. The same is true for the scholar-
ship athlete. If an athlete were to engage in unlawful conduct, his or her
scholarship could be withdrawn. 144 Just as in the traditional employment
context, it is clear that the scholarship athlete does not control all aspects
of the duration of the employment relationship.
e. Required Skill
Undoubtedly, college athletes must possess a high level of skill in
their respective sports, enabling them to compete at the college level.
Only the most skilled athletes receive scholarships. Accordingly, tre-
mendous talent and highly specialized skill in a particular sport is a pre-
requisite for obtaining an athletic scholarship. Colleges and universities
seek the most talented players, in hopes of creating a winning team, as
demonstrated by the amount of time that colleges and universities spend
on recruiting, practicing, and coaching college athletes. 45
143. MANUAL, supra note 112, at art. 15.3.4.1(a)-(d).
144. Id.
145. Archer, supra note 95, at 120.
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Similar skill is required in the traditional employment context. Em-
ployers also seek and actively recruit employees with the most skill in
hopes of creating a productive work force. Just as being skilled in a par-
ticular trade or profession is crucial to being hired by an employer, being
skilled in a particular sport is a fundamental aspect of receiving an ath-
letic scholarship.
Based on the preceding analysis and application of the proposed
Athlete Control Test, it is appropriate to characterize the relationship
between a scholarship athlete and an educational institution as that of an
employer and employee. Scholarship athletes contract with the college
or university and agree to provide a service in return for an economic
benefit. Throughout the duration of the contract, a large majority of the
athlete's athletic and non-athletic decisions are made for him or her.
Scholarship athletes do not make their own choices; they are mandated
to perform certain tasks at specific times. Just as an employee satisfies
his or her job requirements in order to avoid termination, a scholarship
athlete must fulfill his or her responsibilities to the educational institu-
tion in order to avoid losing his or her scholarship.
As demonstrated, the scholarship athlete can prove he or she is an
employee of the educational institution. As such, the scholarship athlete
can proceed with a Title VII claim against the college or university.
3. Necessary Elements of Proof for a Title VII Claim
There are two types of discrimination that have been recognized
under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 46 Disparate
treatment is intentional discrimination based upon an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 47 A claim of disparate treatment
requires proof of a discriminatory motive.' 48 Disparate impact is dis-
crimination caused by a neutral employment policy that has a dispropor-
tionate impact on a class of protected persons.149 A disparate impact
claim does not require proof of a discriminatory motive.'50 Because a
disparate treatment claim has the most viability in terms of the gender
inequity present in college athletics, only this type of claim will be dis-
cussed in detail.
146. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR IssuEs iN THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION 6 (1983).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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To prove intentional discrimination under Title VII, a female athlete
would likely use the disparate treatment model. The disparate treatment
model, first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,151 and most
clearly articulated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 52 is used when an individual or several individuals are treated dif-
ferently because of their race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. The
disparate treatment model is useful because it sets forth an evidentiary
framework to be followed by plaintiffs, defendants, and courts in cases
involving alleged intentional discrimination for which there is no direct
evidence.
If the plaintiff only has circumstantial evidence that the employer in-
tentionally discriminates against employees, the plaintiff must proceed
under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. 5 3 However, a
plaintiff may also present direct evidence of discrimination, if it is availa-
ble, to establish that an employer intentionally discriminated against em-
ployees. 54 Direct evidence and the disparate treatment model "are
simply different evidentiary paths by which to resolve the ultimate issue
of defendant's discriminatory intent."' 55
The burden-shifting analysis in the disparate treatment model re-
quires plaintiff to meet all elements of a three-part test. First, the plain-
tiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination.'56 Second, the
defendant must offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the dis-
crimination. 57 Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason of-
fered by the defendant is actually pretext for discrimination. 5
A prima facie case of discrimination is proven when an individual
shows that: (1) they belong to a protected class; (2) they have performed
the job satisfactorily; (3) they have suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated employees more
favorably.159
151. 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973).
152. 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
153. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. When using the disparate treatment
model, the availability of direct evidence of disparate treatment shifts the burden of proof. Id.
at 802. However, in most circumstances, the female athlete will not have direct evidence of
discrimination. Accordingly, this comment will only address the use of the disparate treat-
ment model with circumstantial evidence.
154. Id.
155. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 707 (6th Cir. 1985).
156. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 804.
159. Davis v. McCormick, 898 F. Supp. 1275, 1286 (D. Ill. 1995) (citing Hughes v. Brown,
20 F.3d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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Once the prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the disparate treatment. 160 The reason will be considered
nondiscriminatory if it has its basis in anything not prohibited by Title
VII.
After the employer has offered a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action, the plaintiff may challenge the offered rea-
sons by showing that they are simply pretext for discrimination.' 6' Pre-
text is defined as a false or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the
actual or strong reason or motive.' 62 It can be established by proving
that: (1) the employer's explanation has no basis in fact; or (2) the em-
ployer's explanation was not the real reason; or (3) that the stated rea-
son is insufficient to warrant the disparate treatment. 63
4. Application to College Athletics
The preceding burden structure is seemingly ideal for the female
scholarship athlete who, as an employee of her college or university, is
subjected to disparate treatment resulting from the educational institu-
tion's policies and budgetary allotments within the athletic department.
To further demonstrate the compatibility between a female athlete's dis-
crimination claim and the use of Title VII, the preceding burden struc-
tures will be applied to the context of college athletics. The following
analysis of the facts in Pederson v. Louisiana State University" will
demonstrate how Title VII can be used to remedy an instance of discrim-
ination at an educational institution.
LSU has offered competitive athletics for female athletes since
1977.165 In the years following 1977, LSU had eight female athletic
teams.' 66 "In 1979, women's fast pitch softball was added, but was
dropped following the 1982-83 season, with no credible reason given."'167
In 1995, LSU decided to add two intercollegiate varsity women's sports,
fast pitch softball and soccer.' 6 Soccer was scheduled to begin competi-
tive conference play in the fall of 1995; competitive conference play for
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (6'" ed. 1990).
163. Davis, 898 F. Supp at 1286.
164. 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
165. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp 892, 901 (D. La. 1996).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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softball was scheduled to begin in 1997.169 However, in January 1996,
neither the facilities nor the recruiting for either team was complete.170
Additionally, although eleven scholarships were allocated for each team,
only two partial softball scholarships had been awarded, and "less than
the full compliment of soccer scholarships [had] been awarded.' 17 1
The plaintiffs in the case asserted a claim for unequal treatment of
female athletes. 17  Included in the claim were assertions of "unequal
pay to coaches, lesser quality facilities and other related grievances."' 173
Additionally, testimony in the case revealed that administrators at
LSU had an "archaic" attitude towards female athletics. 7 4 In fact, the
Pederson court found that LSU "persisted in a systematic, intentional,
differential treatment of women."' 75 The court stated that:
LSU perpetuated antiquated stereotypes and fashioned a grossly
discriminatory athletics system in many.., ways. For example,
LSU appointed a low-level male athletics department staff mem-
ber to the position of "Senior Women's Athletic Administrator,"
which the NCAA defines as the most senior women in the athletic
department. LSU consistently approved larger budgets for travel,
personnel, and training facilities for men's teams versus women's
teams. The university consistently compensated coaches of wo-
men's teams at a rate far below that of its male coaches .... LSU
arguably acted with deliberate indifference to the condition of its
female athletics program. 76
The facts and findings in Pederson illustrate that gender inequity was
present at LSU, and that female athletes were subject to discrimination
based on their sex.177 Accordingly, a female scholarship athlete at LSU
169. Id.
170. Pederson, 912 F. Supp at 902.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 904.
173. Id. It must be noted that the plaintiffs in Pederson were not varsity athletes. Rather,
they were women who believed they would qualify to participate on either the soccer or soft-
ball team if said teams were implemented by LSU. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Pederson
would not likely meet the definition of employee, as discussed earlier in this paper, and there-
fore, they would not have been well served to proceed under Title VII. However, the facts of
the case, and the discriminatory practices at LSU, could easily have been used as evidence of
discrimination by a female scholarship athlete at LSU to prove a case of discrimination under
Title VII. Accordingly, although the facts of the case have been set out as specific to the
Pederson plaintiffs, they will be used to demonstrate how a Title VII claim would have been
beneficial to an existing female scholarship athlete at LSU.
174. Id. at 881.
175. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 881 (5t' Cir. 2000).
176. Id. at 881-82.
177. Id.
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could have filed a suit under Title VII based on the legal theory articu-
lated in this comment.
a. Application of the Disparate Treatment Model to the
Facts of Pederson
Assuming that a female scholarship athlete at LSU proved her status
as an employee of the university by use of the Athlete Control Test dis-
cussed earlier, she would undoubtedly be able to satisfy the necessary
elements of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.
As stated earlier, a female scholarship athlete could establish her
prima facie case of discrimination using either direct evidence or circum-
stantial evidence. Although it is possible that a plaintiff facing discrimi-
nation under the facts of Pederson would have direct evidence of
discrimination, the following application of the disparate treatment
model will assume that only circumstantial evidence is present.
First, as a female, the LSU scholarship athlete is a member of a pro-
tected class. Second, assume that the athlete is fulfilling her athletic re-
sponsibilities in a satisfactory manner. Third, the athlete suffered an
adverse employment action (disparate treatment) as shown by the find-
ings in Pederson. As stated, the court found that LSU intended to treat
female athletes differently "on the basis of their sex by providing them
unequal athletic opportunity."' 78 Presumably, evidence of disparate
treatment must have been present for the Pederson court to make such a
determination. Fourth, the similarly situated male athletes receive far
better treatment in terms of budgetary allotment, scholarships, and
fringe benefits of participation in the college or university athletic pro-
gram. This finding is also supported by the language of the Pederson
court.
179
The next step under the disparate treatment model is for the accused
employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged
discrimination. The court states that LSU had "not even attempted to
offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the blatantly differ-
ential treatment of male and female athletes, and men's and women's
athletics in general; they merely argue archaic values do not equate to
intentional discrimination."'8 ° Although LSU did not offer a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason to defend the claim of a Title IX violation,
they would be required to do so if defending a claim under Title VII.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 881.
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While it is difficult to anticipate every counter argument that LSU, or
any other educational institution, could offer, it is safe to assume that
LSU would offer a nondiscriminatory reason that it believed to be legiti-
mate, such as budget constraints or lack of interest in female athletics.
Finally, the female scholarship athlete at LSU would need to prove
that this legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by LSU was sim-
ply pretext for discrimination. The reasons potentially offered by LSU,
or any other educational institution, are pre-textual. LSU intentionally
denied female athletes the same privileges of employment received by
men because female programs were not the money makers and generally
did not bring the institution national recognition.' 8 ' LSU acknowledged
that it had "archaic" views concerning the female athletic program. 82
Accordingly, the Pederson court correctly held that LSU intended its dis-
criminatory practices. The scholarship athlete would have successfully
demonstrated pretext on the part of LSU.
As demonstrated, a female scholarship athlete at LSU could satisfy
her evidentiary burden and show that discriminatory practices at LSU
resulted in the disparate treatment toward female athletes. As stated, a
disparate treatment analysis focuses on whether the accused employer
had a discriminatory motive. The facts and findings in Pederson make it
clear that a discriminatory motive existed. Based on the preceding appli-
cation of the disparate treatment model to college athletics, it can be
concluded that a female athlete subjected to disparate treatment or im-
pact by her college or university should succeed with a Title VII claim
and be afforded the available remedies.
5. Remedies Available Under Title VII
When there is a finding of employment discrimination under Title
VII, several remedies exist, including hiring, reinstatement, reasonable
accommodation, promotion, back pay, front pay, or other actions that
will make the wronged individual whole.'83 The majority of these reme-
dies are inapplicable to the employer-employee relationship created by
the athletic scholarship. However, under Title VII, the court does have
rather broad discretion in awarding remedies.
A court would be justified in ordering an educational institution to
modify its current practices or to implement new policies to eliminate
disparate treatment of female athletes. Such an award would not afford
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. EEOC, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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the specific plaintiff any direct monetary relief in the form of damages,
front pay, or back pay (differing from most remedies given under Title
VII); however, the nature of the relief would still be monetary and the
female athlete would still benefit from the award.
For example, if a court ordered an educational institution to restruc-
ture its budgetary allocations so that men and women receive equal
funding, the change would affect the economic structure of the college or
university. Additionally, if an educational institution were ordered to
provide new facilities or equipment for the female teams, those provi-
sions would certainly be costly. Although the athletes would not person-
ally receive damages for being treated disparately, the female athletes
would still benefit from the relief awarded.
The obvious benefit from this type of relief award is twofold. First,
awards that order educational institutions to implement new policies to
remedy disparate treatment achieve the ultimate goal of balancing the
resources available for male and female athletes. Second, the threat of
forced economic restructuring may deter colleges and universities from
promoting gender inequity in their athletic department practices.
Accordingly, the relief available under Title VII may serve to effec-
tively eliminate the disparate treatment female athletes receive in their
share of the benefits of participating in college athletic programs. Al-
though Title IX is capable of providing female athletes with a similar
remedy, the use of Title IX to effectuate such change has become stag-
nant. Title VII cannot offer any additional remedy when compared to
Title IX, but the use of Title VII could plausibly be the catalyst needed
to re-ignite the quest for gender equity.
V. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF APPLYING TITLE VII TO
COLLEGE ATHLETICS
The successful application of Title VII to college athletics brings with
it acceptance of the idea that a scholarship athlete is an employee of his
or her educational institution. That finding would undoubtedly disrupt
the current structure of the NCAA and college athletic programs. Al-
though a distinction is made between the definition of employee under
Title VII and other statutes, such as workers compensation, defining the
scholarship athlete as an employee in any context would prompt scholar-
ship athletes to file other claims for which a finding of an employment
relationship is necessary. While it cannot be stated that athletes will suc-
ceed with claims other than Title VII, it certainly can be stated that the
NCAA will encounter more lawsuits.
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If Title VII were successfully applied to college athletics, the door
would be open to a whole new host of litigation. However, that should
not deter the use of Title VII in the context of college athletics. As evi-
denced by the earlier analysis of the Pederson case, Title VII has the
potential to remedy many of the gender inequities that are present in
college athletics. When Title IX was initially introduced, it too presented
many potential ramifications for educational institutions, but it has, in
many regards, helped female athletes in their quest for gender equality.
If applied correctly, Title VII has the potential to be just as successful, if
not more so, than Title IX, and effectively eliminate gender inequity in
the area of athlete benefits in college athletic programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is impossible to assert with absolute certainty that the
application of Title VII will fully remedy the gender equity problems
that exist in college athletics, there is a viable argument that Title VII
can accomplish what Title IX was intended to do, and yet has often
failed to do. It is time to move past the stagnancy resulting from Title
IX; it is time to apply Title VII to college athletic programs.
This comment focuses on the viability of Title VII as an additional
resource female scholarship athletes can use to remedy gender inequity
in college athletics. Title VII is not being offered as a substitute for Title
IX. However, a new problem-solving method is needed if female ath-
letes are going to achieve the gender equity they deserve.
The largest hurdle the scholarship athlete must overcome when at-
tempting to use Title VII is the establishment of the employer-employee
relationship between scholarship athletes and universities; however, this
hurdle is not insurmountable."l When analyzed using the proposed
Athlete Control Test, a scholarship athlete qualifies as an employee of
the educational institution under Title VII. Accordingly, the scholarship
athlete should be afforded the protections offered by Title VII.
184. The ordinary athletic scholarship does indeed create an employer-employee rela-
tionship. For a variety of unarticulated reasons-foremost among them the fear of
unchartered waters-it is not surprising that the courts have tended to refuse (under
workers' compensation statutes) to hold that amateur athletes are really employees. It
is an uncomfortable and unsettling realization that scholarship athletes are really em-
ployees, but it is a conclusion that an honest appraisal compels. And it is a conclusion
from which a number of beneficial consequences will undoubtedly flow, contributing to
the reform of a system much in need of constructive change.
Archer, supra note 95, at 117 (quoting RAY YASSER ET" AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERI-
ALS (3d ed. 1994)).
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There is no question that female athletes have more opportunities
and athletic privileges than twenty-five years ago. However, that fact
should not serve as a barrier to a continued quest for equality. Female
athletes are still subject to disparate treatment, and although Title VII
has never been applied in this context before, it provides a new avenue
to effectuate change. While both Title IX and Title VII exist as methods
of eliminating gender inequality, it is often taking the road less traveled
that makes all the difference. 185
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185. FROST, supra note 7, at 119.

